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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE, particularly the warrant requirement,
has been adapted to an increasing array of legal and practical diffi-
culties created by the proliferation of motor vehicles in American society.
The dire need for effective law enforcement procedures, on the one hand,
has been pitted against the obligation to safeguard valuable fourth amend-
ment liberties on the other. The tension between these competing interests
is reflected in the diverse viewpoints expressed in countless court deci-
sions of the past half century. The United States Supreme Court has been
sharply divided on the many troublesome issues regarding the warrantless
search and seizure of a motor vehicle and its contents, particularly con-
tainers.
* The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Jack A.
Guttenberg, Assistant Professor of Law at the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law,
Cleveland State University.
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Most of the initial controversy concerned the constitutionality of war-
rantless searches and seizures of the automobile1 itself. In 1925, the Court
created the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement under
which warrantless searches and seizures were permitted where police
had probable cause to believe that contraband was contained somewhere
in the vehicle.2 In addition to the automobile exception, the Court also
validated a warrantless vehicular search under the "search incident to
a lawful arrest exception" where probable cause to search need not exist.'
The Court also announced a third exception, the "inventory search excep-
tion," which permits police to conduct warrantless searches and seizures
of legally impounded vehicles for the sole purpose of inventorying per-
sonal belongings located inside the vehicle.4
The scope of these exceptions has been litigated since 1925. Three recent
Supreme Court cases have brought two of these exceptions full circle,
however, by validating warrantless searches of closed opaque containers
located in automobiles. In a 1981 case, New York v. Belton,, the Court
created a "bright line" rule upholding the warrantless search of containers
taken from a vehicle pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception.
In a companion case, Robbins v. California,' a plurality of the Court in-
validated the warrantless search of closed opaque containers discovered
during a lawful automobile exception search. The following year in United
States v. Ross,' however, a majority of the Court abandoned the Robbins
rationale and held that such warrantless container searches are valid under
the automobile exception if based on probable cause.8 The Court has not
yet addressed the warrantless container search issue under the inven-
tory search exception
I The words automobile and motor vehicle are used interchangeably
throughout this Note and include all types and varieties of motor vehicles because
the operative rules of law are generally not affected by the use of the vehicle.
However, distinctive characteristics of the particular vehicle may help resolve
such legal questions as the person's expectation of privacy in a particular com-
partment of the vehicle or the degree of ready access to its contents.
2 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
3 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
4 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (plurality opinion).
1 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
6 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion).
7 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). The retirement of Justice Stewart (an-
nounced in 453 U.S. V (July 2, 1981)), who authored the Belton and Robbins opi-
nions, and the appointment of Justice O'Connor (ordered in 453 U.S. IX (Sept.
25, 1981)), who joined the majority in Ross, may solidify the conservative posture
of the Burger Court.
I Cf. United States v. Chadwick, 443 U.S. 1 (1977) (a search warrant is re-
quired where police have specific information that a particular container located
in a car contains contraband); and infra Section III.
I The resolution of this issue is important because it could give police an
opportunity to search containers without a warrant where they could not do so
under the other automobile-related warrant exceptions. If police were permitted
to routinely search containers pursuant to a standard inventory search, anything
gained by limiting a search under the other exceptions would be lost. This Note,
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This Note analyzes the development of these warrant exceptions to
furnish a comprehensive review of their justifications. The major focus
is on the underlying rationale of Belton and Ross and the possible ramifica-
tions of such far-reaching warrant exceptions. The Note recommends that
state courts interpret their state constitutions to allow the less drastic
alternative of warrantless seizures of certain containers rather than war-
rantless searches as permitted by Belton and Ross under the federal Con-
stitution. In addition, an analytic methodology for isolating interrelated
yet distinct search and seizure questions is proposed. Initially, a general
background of fourth amendment jurisprudence is set forth to illustrate
the Court's continuous struggle with search and seizure problems.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
A. Traditional Fourth Amendment Analysis
The basic tenet of search and seizure decisional law is that the "Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places" from unwarranted governmental
intrusions.'" This guarantee protects the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, places and things from unreasonable search and seizure
by the government," but does not protect any general right to be let
alone by other people.' 2 The Supreme Court declared long ago that the
however, only contains a limited discussion of this question. See infra notes 137-52
and accompanying text. See also 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE S 7.4 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as LAFAVE].
0 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
" U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The fourth amendment was made applicable to the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
27-28 (1949). Several years later, the judicially created "exclusionary rule" was
also imposed on the states to prohibit the use at trial of illegally obtained evidence
to support the prosecution's case-in-chief. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). But
see United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (suppressed evidence may be
used for impeachment purposes where the defendant's direct examination
reasonably suggests this mode of cross-examination).
Most state constitutions contain provisions that parallel the fourth amendment.
See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. 1, S 14. State courts, however, are free to interpret
their state constitutions liberally to provide greater protection, in certain instances,
than has been provided by fourth amendment interpretations of the Supreme
Court. Furthermore, state interpretation of state constitutions is not subject to
federal judicial review. See 28 U.S.C. S 1257 (1976). Accordingly, the challenges
to the admissibility of evidence should be made under both the federal and state
constitutions. See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of In-
dividual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
" Katz, 389 U.S. at 350"51.
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"sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of his life" constitute the
"essence of constitutional liberty and security," but that the nature of
the intrusion "is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of
his drawers .... [rather] it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property .... ""
Three fundamental issues must be resolved when confronting a given
fact situation involving a search and seizure: 1) whether the evidence was
obtained by a government sponsored activity; 2) whether that activity
constituted a search and/or seizure; and 3) whether the search and/or
seizure required a warrant or was otherwise reasonable. Under the
threshold question, whether evidence was obtained by a government spon-
sored activity, the answer is obvious in most instances because law en-
forcement officials will be directly involved. Yet the answer will be less
clear in other situations, for example, police may encourage a person sur-
reptitiously to acquire incriminating information or material for their use.14
Absent a showing that that person was in effect acting as a government
agent, fourth amendment protections will not be invoked since only
governmental intrusions are governed thereby.
If there was governmental action, then the second level of analysis is
needed to determine whether that activity constituted a search and/or
seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment." A "search" only
occurs when the government violates a person's legitimate expectation
of privacy, which is protected by the fourth amendment. 6 The applicable
inquiry, the Katz test, 7 has two requirements. First, a person must "have
13 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
14 See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980) (a paid informant generally
acts as a government agent).
11 The importance of this step is critical to proper fourth amendment analysis
because the third level of inquiry is irrelevant if a search or seizure did not occur.
Moreover, the failure to address each level in sequence, whether as a tactical
manuever or as an oversight, has contributed to decisional confusion. Indeed, the
greatest shortcoming of judicial search and seizure analysis thus far has been
the failure to approach the problem with a disciplined step-by-step process.
Haphazard legal analysis has compounded confusion in a complex area of the law.
As an end result, critical fourth amendment doctrines have been adopted
without a full discussion on the merits. For example, in the landmark case of
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court expressly declined to decide the "con-
stitutional propriety" of an investigatory stop of three suspicious men observed
"casing" a store. Id. at 19 n.16. Nonetheless, Terry upheld the subsequent "frisk"
of the suspects and the seizure of a weapon without first deciding whether the
initial stop on less than probable cause was a "seizure" and if so whether it was
constitutionally permissible. Id. at 6-7. The implication of Terry is that such stops
are valid; otherwise, the seizure of the gun would have been tainted by the ini-
tial illegal seizure of the suspects and would have been suppressed under the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963). Moreover, while the stop may in fact have been reasonable under the
fourth amendment, the method used to approve it was significantly lacking.
"e Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
" The Katz test was formulated by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion
in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967). A majority of the Court adopted
[Vol. 31:529
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol31/iss3/9
WARRANTLESS CONTAINER SEARCHES
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and, second that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reason-
able'" (objective).18 Thus, a fourth amendment search does not occur at
all unless there is a legitimate expectation of privacy.19 For example, the
Court has found both a subjective and objective expectation of privacy
in one's dwelling,0 but has found only a subjective expectation in motor
vehicles.21
A "seizure," on the other hand, occurs where the government detains
an individual without his consent or exercises exclusive control over an
object. Formal arrests clearly constitute "seizures" but other police-citizen
confrontations short of arrest are not always "seizures." The Supreme
Court has indicated that a person is "seized" only when an officer has
in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen by the show of authority
or use of physical force. Other problems may arise as to whether certain
communications, physical characteristics or evidentiary items can be seized
at all within the meaning of the fourth amendment; e.g., overheard con-
versations, fingerprints, voiceprints, bloodtype, etc. Such seizures are
generally governed by the maxim: "What a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection."23
Once it has been determined that a government sponsored search or
seizure has occurred, then the third level of inquiry must be resolved,
i.e., whether the search and/or seizure was "reasonable." Here the govern-
ment practice must either pass constitutional muster under the general
reasonableness provision of the fourth amendment or under the warrant
clause. This third level of inquiry has been a source of endless conflict
the test in several later cases to the extent that it now subsumes a major portion
of fourth amendment analysis. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980);
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
"I 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
19 Similarly, a person waives his expectation of privacy when he freely and
voluntarily consents to the search or seizure. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
' See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
21 See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). But see United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 551 n.5 (1980) (dicta), in which Justices Stewart and Rehnquist opined
that the questioning of a suspect fitting a "drug courier profile" did not amount
to a "seizure." They indicated further that a person is seized "only, if in view
of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave." Id. at 554. Arguably, the test was misap-
plied in Mendenhall since cooperation is more often motivated by societally en-
dorsed respect for authority figures, rather than by an independent desire to
cooperate voluntarily. See also State v. Reid, 247 Ga. 445, 276 S.E.2d 617 (1981)
(paraphrasing the Mendenhall dicta, the court held that an investigatory stop of
suspects resembling the drug courier profile did not amount to a "seizure"). See
generally Voluntary Consent Incident to Investigatory Stop, 4 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
739 (1981).
22 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. This maxim is commonly referred to as the "plain
view" doctrine.
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within the Court because of the debatable connection between the two
clauses." The fourth amendment unquestionably prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures and clearly sets forth that probable cause is re-
quired before a warrant will be issued, but the nexus between the clauses
is unclear. That is, did the Framers equate the warrant requirement with
reasonableness so that no search or seizure is reasonable without the
authority of a properly drawn and executed warrant? In the late 1960's
the Court responded to this issue by declaring succinctly that "searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior judicial approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. '2 5 Despite this seemingly strict constructionist rhetoric, the
Court added the caveat that this rule is "subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions."26
Instead of pronouncing a rule of per se unreasonableness then, the Court
has actually created rules of per se reasonableness favoring the prosecu-
tion. " While the prosecution does carry the burden of proving that a par-
ticular fact situation is covered by a warrant exception,28 the warrantless
search and/or seizure is automatically deemed reasonable if it fits into
an established exception. This task becomes less difficult as the list of
warrant exceptions continues to expand.' In any event, absent exigent
24 In the first major interpretation of the fourth amendment, the Court liberally
construed the amendment and implicitly recognized that the two clauses operate
independently. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623-26, 635 (1886). See J. LAN-
DYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 58 (1966). After analyz-
ing the amendment's history, Landynski rejected the position that the
reasonableness clause provided an additional search power beyond the warrant
requirement. Id. at 42-44.
Since Boyd, the Court has expressed contrasting viewpoints on the amend-
ment's meaning. Compare United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950)
(reasonableness is not measured by the existence of a warrant), and Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 772-73 (1969) (White, J., dissenting); with Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-84 (1971) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion), and Harris
v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (reasonableness is determined by the war-
rant requirement).
25 Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. See also Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 161
(1947) (Justice Frankfurter stated in dissent that "searches are 'unreasonable'
unless authorized by a warrant").
26 389 U.S. at 357. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 6 for an argument
in support of the present warrant system. LaFave suggests that an expansive
warrant requirement would lead to a mechanical routine that would not serve
the desired purposes. Instead, LaFave submits that: "[A]s a practical matter, the
warrant process [serves] as a meaningful device for the protection of the Fourth
Amendment rights only if used selectively to prevent those police practices which
would be most destructive of Fourth Amendment values." Id.
' See Haddad, Well-Defined Exceptions, Claims of Sham, and Fourfold Prob-
able Cause, 68 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 198, 203 (1977).
2" United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
' The most common warrant exceptions include:
1. Automobile exception,
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925);
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circumstances, the Court requires an arrest warrant for the arrest of a
person in his home,"0 a search warrant for the search of his home" and
both if an individual is to be arrested in the home of a third person.2
However, a warrant is not required for the arrest of a person in a public
place' nor for a search of an automobile made within the parameters of
the automobile exception,u but these intrusions must be supported by
probable cause.
Probable cause35 to arrest is established by information sufficient to
support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that
the person sought committed that offense." Whereas, probable cause to
search must establish the probability that the items sought are connected
with criminal activity and will be found in the place to be searched. 7 The
Court has further indicated that probable cause encompasses non-technical
probabilities that amount to "more than bare suspicion."38 These proba-
bilities should be based upon "factual and practical considerations of every-
2. Searches incident to lawful arrests,
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969);
3. Inventory Searches of automobiles,
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976);
4. Stop and Frisk,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968);
5. Emergency searches under exigent circumstances,
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966);
6. Investigatory vehicular stops,
State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St. 2d 291, 414 N.E.2d 1044 (1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 822 (1981) (court applied balancing test from Terry);
and
7. Roving border patrol searches,
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
For a listing of over twenty-five exceptions, see Haddad, supra note 27, at 199-201.Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
31 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search warrant is required
to search that area of a person's home that is not within his immediate control
at the time of a lawful arrest); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32-33 (1925).
32 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
3 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
3, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
31 See Haddad, supra note 27, at 214-15. Haddad suggests that probable cause
should be broken down into four categories:
1. Crime probable cause in support of the belief that an offense has
been committed;
2. Offender probable cause in support of the probability that a particular
person did it;
3. Search probable cause in support of the probability that a search
will prove fruitful; and
4. Seizure probable cause in support of the probability that the item
is contraband or evidence.
36 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
3 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 417-19 (1969).
38 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
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day life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."'
Where a warrant is required, a warrant application must be submitted
to a magistrate who is "neutral and detached"'" as well as "capable of
determining [whether] probable cause exists."'41 Probable cause can be
based upon hearsay, 42 such as information obtained from a reliable
informant.' Not surprisingly, the Court has expressed a strong preference
for arrest warrants" and search warrants 4' even where not required. Ac-
cordingly, on a close question of fact regarding probable cause the scales
will tip in favor of upholding the search or seizure where a warrant was
issued.
4
1
Where neither a warrant nor probable cause to support a warrant ex-
ception is required, the general reasonableness clause has been used to
justify the intrusion. In Terry v. Ohio,7 the Court set forth a balancing
test where the right to be free from unwarranted intrusions is weighed
against such government interests as police safety, preservation of
evidence, prevention of escape and effective crime prevention or detec-
tion. However, the Court has implied that the overall test for reasonable-
ness is less stringent than the test for probable cause.4' In recent years,
the Supreme Court has been sensitive to law enforcement's need for an
"escalating set of flexible responses, graduated in relation to the amount
of information they possess"" to allow them to deal more effectively with
"rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations on city streets."5 Ac-
" Id. Accord Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
" Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion) (state
attorney general who doubled as a justice of the peace was not a "neutral and
detached magistrate" who could issue a valid search warrant in an investigation
for which he was chief prosecutor). See also Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245
(1977) (an unsalaried justice of the peace who was paid a fee when he issued a
warrant but nothing if he denied the application was not neutral and detached).
41 Shadwick v. Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972) (upholding city provision that
authorized municipal court clerks to issue arrest warrants for violations of
municipal ordinances).
42 Police routinely swear out affidavits based on information obtained by
witnesses, informants or the victim.
41 Information supplied by informers presents special problems that can be
overcome under the Aguilar-Spinelli test. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)
(an informer's previous credibility coupled with the underlying circumstances form-
ing the basis for his information can demonstrate reliability); Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (where an informer's source of information is not disclos-
ed, the defect can be cured if the amount of detail permits a reasonable inference
that the information was gained in a reliable manner).
" Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
41 United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
41 Id. at 109.
4' 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The government practice will be upheld if it is only a
"minimal intrusion" on civil liberties and is reasonable in light of the totality
of circumstances. Id. at 21.
4" Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968).
50 Id. Accord Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1972).
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cordingly, several warrantless government practices not supported by
probable cause have been upheld"1 under the reasonableness clause while
only a few have been invalidated.2
B. The Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest Exception
1. Searching the Arrestee
One of the most pervasive police practices is the search of a person's
body as soon as he or she is formally arrested. Such warrantless searches
had been approved by the Court in dicta' for several decades. In 1973,
this police practice survived a strong fourth amendment challenge in the
companion cases of United States v. Robinson' and Gustafson v. Florida."5
The Robinson Court flatly rejected the argument that only a limited
Terry-type "frisk" for weapons should be permitted on the grounds that
a search incident to an arrest is supported by arrest probable cause,
while a frisk is a limited weapons search based on less than probable
cause. 7 The Court reasoned that since a lawful arrest is reasonable under
the fourth amendment, then a subsequent search of the arrestee is likewise
51 See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (search warrant
"implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the
premises while a proper search is conducted"); United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544 (1980) (investigatory stop of a woman in an airport concourse based on
characteristics consistent with a "drug courier profile"); Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106 (1977) (police practice of ordering driver out of car pursuant to a
valid traffic violation stop and the subsequent frisk when the officer noticed a
bulge in the driver's coat were upheld under Terry); United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (roving border patrols can stop motorists near a border
for a brief inquiry into their residence status); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
(stop and frisk on less than probable cause was upheld); State v. Freeman, 64
Ohio St. 2d 291, 414 N.E.2d 1044 (1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 822 (1981) (investi-
gatory vehicular stop upheld).
52 See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (random stops of motor
vehicles merely to check the driver's license and car registration constitute
unreasonable seizures); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (Terry's balanc-
ing test held not applicable to the custodial questioning of a suspect where police
lack probable cause to arrest). See also Miles, From Terry to Mimms: The
Unacknowledged Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protections Surrounding Police-
Citizen Confrontations, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127 (1979).
" See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (dictum); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925) (dictum).
54 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
s 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
See Haddad, supra note 27, at 214-15. Arrest probable cause consists of crime
probable cause (belief that an offense has been committed) and offender probable
cause (probability that a particular person did it).
" 414 U.S. at 227. The suspect in Robinson was searched as required by police
department regulations and was arrested for a traffic violation which carried a
mandatory jail term. Id. at 220. Furthermore, the search was not motivated by
the fear of imminent danger, nor need it be according to the Robinson Court.
Id. at 235.
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reasonable and "requires no additional justification."' Furthermore, the
search is justified both by the greater need to protect police from ex-
tended exposure to suspects taken into custody and transported to a police
station, and by the need to preserve evidence.59 In Gustafson, the Court
added that the authority to search a person pursuant to a lawful arrest
is per se reasonable under the fourth amendment regardless of the degree
of the offense."
The following year, in United States v. Edwards,"1 the Court upheld
the delayed warrantless search of a burglary suspect who had been in
jail overnight.2 The Court stated that a search that could have been made
at the "time of arrest may legally be conducted later when the accused
arrives at the place of detention."' Thus, Edwards did away with the
requirement that the search of the arrestee be conducted contempora-
neously with the arrest. Edwards is in direct conflict however, with other
cases that prohibit delayed searches under the search incident exception
regarding containers, 4 automobiles65 and the area within the arrestee's
immediate control.6 6
2. Containers Carried by the Arrestee
The Court has yet to address directly the question of whether a war-
rant is required to search or even seize containers being carried by an
arrestee. In United States v. Robinson, the Court upheld the search and
seizure of a container, a cigarette package taken from an inside coat
I Id. at 235. "It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority
to search." Id. Furthermore, in Katz terms, a person subject to a lawful custodial
arrest loses his legitimate expectation of privacy of his person; therefore, the
lawful arrest is a "legitimate and overriding governmental concern" that usurps
the fourth amendment privacy interest. Id. at 237 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 234-35.
o 414 U.S. at 264. Like Robinson, Gustafson was arrested for a minor traffic
violation. Gustafson is factually distinguishable from Robinson in that the search
conducted by the police was not pursuant to departmental policy, and there was
no mandatory jail term for the offense. Id. at 263.
61 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
62 Id. at 801. The arrestee's clothes were taken from him the morning after
the arrest and were inspected for paint chips from the scene of the burglary.
Id. at 802. The delay was also held reasonable because the arrest was made late
at night and no other clothes were available until morning. Id. at 805.
Id. at 803.
" United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); see infra notes 159-76 and
accompanying text.
65 Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964). But see Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (the delayed search of an automobile is valid under
the automobile exception), and infra notes 102-20 and accompanying text.
6 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Arguably, the result in Edwards
can be distinguished from the delayed search prohibition of Chimel, Chadwick
and Preston, because the arrestee in Edwards still had access to the evidence
(paint chips) since he continued to wear the clothing worn at the time of the arrest.
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pocket, without analyzing each phase of the intrusion." Arguably, con-
tainers found on arrestees are so closely associated with the person that
upholding the search per se is a pragmatic solution to the volatile con-
frontation of a custodial arrest. However, it is less clear whether a per
se warrantless search rule for containers being carried by an arrestee
is necessary to neutralize the confrontation. Instead, the government in-
terests of police safety and preservation of evidence only justify the im-
mediate seizure of the package, since a container once reduced to exclusive
police control no longer poses a serious danger." Thus, in Katz terms,
a person does have a legitimate expectation of privacy as to any subse-
quent warrantless search of the container's contents. 9 Moreover, this ra-
tionale strikes a balance which maintains the status quo with the least
possible intrusion. Indeed, many courts have followed this line of reason-
ing and have invalidated warrantless searches of containers under the
search incident to arrest exception.3
3. Searching the Area Within Arrestee's Immediate Control
While the practice of searching the arrestee's person pursuant to a
lawful arrest has long been regarded as legally permissible,7 the scope
of a warrantless search of the area surrounding the arrestee at the time
of arrest was in a constant state of flux until Chimel v. California." In
Chimel, three policemen waited for a burglary suspect to enter his home
before executing an arrest warrant. 3 Pursuant to the arrest, but without
67 414 U.S. 218, 223 (1973). As the dissent pointed out, there were three distinct
phases: the frisk, the removal of an unknown object and the opening of the package.
Id. at 249 (dissenting opinion).
If the police had reason to believe the container presented any imminent
danger to life or limb, then the additional step of a warrantless search would
be justifiable under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant require-
ment. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
" See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765 n.14 (1979) (upholding the
warrantless seizure of a suitcase taken from an automobile but not the subse-
quent warrantless search); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (privacy
interest in the contents of a footlocker was not diminished by the lawful arrest).
70 See, e.g., United States v. Benson, 631 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated
and remanded, 453 U.S. 918 (1981) (remanded for reconsideration in light of New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)); United States v. Calandrella, 605 F.2d 236
(6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1980). For additional cases, see LAFAVE,
supra note 9, at 77-78 nn.23.1-.2 (Supp. 1982).
71 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 225 (1973).
12 395 U.S. 752, 755-60 (1969). The Chimel majority opinion accurately chronicles
the embattled history of the rule. Id. It is sufficient to say here that Chimel over-
rules such cases as Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), which had
upheld a one-and-a-half hour warrantless search of the drawers, files and safe
in a one room office, and Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), which had
upheld the warrantless search of a room separate from the one where the arrest
occurred. 395 U.S. at 768.
"' 395 U.S. at 753.
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a search warrant or consent, the police searched the entire house for forty-
five minutes until the stolen coins were found.74
The Chimel Court invalidated the search of the house, thus preventing
police from undercutting the search warrant requirement which was
designed to protect the sanctity of the home. As a consequence, the Court
held that the "scope of the search must be 'strictly tied to and justified
by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible."7 Accord-
ingly, Chimel limited the space in which a warrantless search incident
to a lawful arrest can occur to that area within the arrestee's immediate
control, i.e., "the area within which he might gain possession of a weapon
or destructible evidence."76 Furthermore, Chimel prohibits the routine
search of "any room other than that in which an arrest occurs . . . [or
a broad search of] all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas
in that room itself' that are not within the arrestee's immediate control.
7 7
Moreover, the limited search is justified both by the need for police safety
and for the preservation of evidence.7 8
Chimel's effect on the practice of searching containers located within
the arrestee's immediate control is an open question. This issue should
be analyzed by a two tier approach. The first question is whether the
container itself is within the area of arrestee's immediate control. If it
is, then police should clearly be permitted to seize it. The second issue
is whether the inside of the container is also within easy reach of the
arrestee, i.e., within his immediate control. 9 The answer to this second
question will depend on such relevant factors as the nature of the con-
tainer, whether it is locked or otherwise sealed, or whether the arrestee
is physically restrained in any way. Thus, if it can be reasonably said
that the contents were not easily accessible, then the additional intru-
sion of a warrantless search in an area outside of the arrestee's immediate
control would be invalid."°
However, the Court's recent pronouncement of a per se rule in New
York v. Belton"1 suggests a strong tendency for clear-cut rules in the
custodial arrest setting. The Belton Court applied the Chimel "immediate
control" doctrine in support of its holding that the warrantless search
of the passenger compartment of an automobile is always reasonable when
" Id. at 753-54.
" Id. at 762 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).
78 Id. at 763. The Court thereby preserved, to the most realistic degree, the
traditional expectation of privacy in the security of one's home.
" Id. In addition, the search must be contemporaneous, i.e., not "remote in
time or place from the arrest." Id. at 764. Thus, a house cannot be searched as
incident to an arrest which occurs on the front porch. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S.
30 (1970).
78 395 U.S. at 763.
78 See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977).
80 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
81 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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made incident to the lawful arrest of the occupants.' Moreover, the Belton
Court encompassed the warrantless search of containers found therein
as also within the rule. Furthermore, the Belton rule might be extended
to containers seized in the non-automobile context as evidenced by a recent
Court order remanding a case for reconsideration in light of Belton."
C. The Automobile Exception
1. Early Development
"The word 'automobile"M is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth
Amendment fades away and disappears."8 5 Despite this proclamation, a
search warrant is generally not required to search a motor vehicle or
containers or compartments therein. In carving out the "automobile excep-
tion" however, the Court spun an endless web of confusing standards in
an effort to guide conscientious law enforcement officials. This Section
will isolate the major problems under this exception that have arisen over
the years.
The Court first confronted the warrantless automobile search issue in
Carroll v. United States.' Mr. Justice Taft, author of the majority opinion,
upheld the warrantless intrusion by construing the fourth amendment
in "light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when
it was adopted, and in a manner which will [allegedly] conserve public
interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens."" The
Carroll Court reasoned that since the Founding Fathers comprised the
First, Second and Fourth Congresses, statutes passed by those Congresses
were evidence of the Framers' intent." After analyzing several statutes,
the Court noted that the lawmakers had distinguished between the
necessity for obtaining search warrants for goods subject to forfeiture
when in a dwelling and those goods concealed and being transported in
a movable vessel.' Consequently, the Carroll Court concluded that the
82 Id. at 460.
' United States v. Benson, 631 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded,
453 U.S. 918 (1981).
84 For analytical purposes, the automobile should be thought of as both an
object and a place. As an object, its exterior and certain portions of the interior
are in plain view so that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. As a place,
it is a container in which a person has been deemed to have a diminished expec-
tation of privacy. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590-91 (1974) (plurality
opinion).
' Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971) (plurality opinion).
9 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In Carroll, federal prohibition officers pulled over a
car driven by a known prohibition violator believed to be making a, "run." Id.
at 134-35. They searched the car without a warrant and without probable cause
to arrest and found sixty-eight quarts of whiskey and gin inside the back seat.
Id. For an in-depth analysis of Carroll, see Knuckles, Warrantless Automobile
Searches: When Are They Constitutionally Permissible?, 65 ILL. B.J. 532 (1977).
267 U.S. at 149.
Id. at 151.
89 Id.
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Framers implicitly recognized the impracticability of obtaining a warrant
to search or seize movable vessels2° The Court proceeded to hold the
intrusion valid under the fourth amendment declaring:
[T]he true rule is that if the search and seizure without a warrant
are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably
arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject
to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid.'
Carroll implicitly established a three part test for justifying the war-
rantless search and seizure of a vehicle: 1) there must be probable cause
that contraband is inside the automobile," 2) it must be impractical to
obtain a warrant, and 3) the vehicle must be mobile. 3 In essense, mobility
is the exigent circumstance that forms the underlying basis for the imprac-
ticability criterion. Since Carroll involved only the search of the
automobile's passenger area, the permissible scope of the exception was
undefined and most subsequent litigation challenged its limitations.
The next automobile case accepted by the Court was Husty, v. United
States," in which Carroll was reaffirmed. In Husty, a vacant car was under
surveillance pursuant to a reliable tip that it was loaded with bootleg
alcohol. The police did nothing until the suspect entered the car and
started the engine at which time the police seized and searched the car
without a warrant.9 5 The Husty search was upheld even though the
automobile had not been moved, on the ground that it would be unrea-
sonable to require the police to leave the scene to obtain a warrant."
Similarly, in Sher v. United States97 the Court upheld the warrantless
search of a car parked in an open garage where the driver was walking
toward his house. 8 The Sher Court extended Carroll to the search of the
90 Id. at 153.
91 Id. at 149. See also United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927), in which the
Court extended the Carroll rationale to warrantless searches of vessels on water-
ways where there is probable cause to believe the boats contain contraband. 274
U.S. 562. But see Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), where the Court
refused to extend Carroll to uphold the warrantless search of a building because
it was reasonably practicable to obtain a warrant.
1 Note that probable cause to arrest the driver is not relevant under this
exception. See Haddad, supra note 27, at 222.
11 The term "mobile" became a misnomer for the Court since, as later cases
revealed, a vehicle is always mobile for constitutional purposes because the fourth
amendment does not permit its seizure to the exclusion of the rest of the world.
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970). Nonetheless, the Carroll Court had
created the distinct impression that mobility meant actual movement and that
for this reason it was impracticable to obtain a search warrant.
4 282 U.S. 694 (1931) (reversed and remanded on other grounds).
11 Id. at 700.
Id. at 701.
97 305 U.S. 251 (1938).
98 Id. at 253.
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trunk and validated the intrusion because the car had been followed into
the garage, the officer was there immediately after it was parked, the
garage itself was not searched and the car could have been properly
stopped earlier.99 Sher and Husty are significant in that they firmly im-
bedded the probable cause" requirement into the exception. Furthermore,
Sher and Husty suggest that mobility means potential movement
regardless of the likelihood of actual movement. Thus, as illustrated by
the facts in Sher, the mobility concept is a legal fiction used to justify
a per se rule of reasonableness.''
Id. at 255.
100 In the early automobile exception previously discussed, the issue of whether
there was probable cause to search the vehicle was often a close question of fact
and a point of disagreement within the Court. This was particularly evident in
a later case, Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), in which the bulk
of the opinion focused on finding probable cause.
In Brinegar, two federal agents were parked near a state line overlooking
a road frequently traveled by bootleggers. Id. at 162, 171. The agents saw a car
pass that appeared to be "heavily loaded" and the driver of which they recognized
as a man with a reputation for transporting liquor illegally. Id. at 162-63. A high
speed chase ensued and the suspect's car was forced off the road. Id. The driver
then admitted having illegal liquor in the car at which point he was arrested
and the car was searched without a warrant. Id. The Court looked at the aggre-
gate facts and found that probable cause to search did exist. Id. at 170.
By looking at the aggregate facts, the Court implicitly conceded that probable
cause did not ripen until after the car was stopped. Id. at 178 (Burton, J., concur-
ring). Such an approach glosses over the question of whether the initial stop,
albeit on less than probable cause, was a valid seizure under the fourth amend-
ment. The concurring opinion addressed the validity of the initial stop and con-
cluded that the government agents had "ample grounds to justify the chase and
official interrogation." Id. As such, a warrantless stop was viewed as reasonable
since: "Nothing occurred that even tended to lessen the reasonableness of the
original basis for the suspicion of the agents that a crime within their particular
line of duty was being committed in their presence." Id. at 179. Notably, this
language closely parallels the rationale adopted later by the Court in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to uphold an investigatory "stop and frisk" of a pedestrian
on less than probable cause. Moreover, some state courts have upheld investigatory
vehicular stops on less than probable cause. See, e.g., State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio
St. 2d 291, 414 N.E.2d 1044 (1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 822 (1981).
101 The most vehement attack on the early development of the automobile ex-
ception came from Justice Jackson in Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 180-88 (dissenting
opinion). He charged that this exception to the warrant requirement tagged fourth
amendment freedoms as "secondary rights" that are "relegated to a deferred
position." Id. at 180. Instead, Justice Jackson argued that these rights are "in-
dispensable freedoms" whose compromise would undermine the hallmark of
American society.
Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a popula-
tion, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every
heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effec-
tive weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government. And one need
only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people possessed of many
admirable qualities but deprived of these rights to know that the human
personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear where
1982]
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The automobile exception was developed further in the 1970 case of
Chambers v. Maroney."0' In Chambers, two armed men robbed a gas sta-
tion forcing the attendant to fill his glove with change." 3 Two observant
teenagers notified police that a station wagon with four occupants had
sped away from a nearby parking lot.' Within the hour, police spotted
the car on a public highway, stopped it and arrested all four occupants.'
The car and the arrestees were transported to the police station where
a thorough warrantless search disclosed two loaded .38 caliber revolvers
and a right hand glove containing coins.' The Chambers Court held the
search invalid under the search incident to arrest exception,' but ap-
proved the delayed search under the automobile exception.'
The Chambers Court upheld the initial warrantless seizure of the vehicle
on Carroll-type practicability grounds since the procedure of following
the car or tracing it hours or days later when a search warrant has been
obtained would be an "impractical alternative" because contraband might
be removed or the vehicle itself taken out of the jurisdiction."' The prac-
ticability argument though, is eviscerated by a subsequent delayed search
of a container (the vehicle itself here) under exclusive police control at
the station house."' The Chambers Court responded to this dilemma by
analyzing the degree of intrusion accompanying both the seizure and the
search in light of the mobility factor.
The majority reasoned that "since a car is readily movable" and the
"opportunity to search is fleeting," the vehicle could either be searched
immediately without a warrant or seized temporarily pending approval
homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour to unheralded
search and seizure by the police.
Id. at 180-81.
399 U.S. 42 (1970).
"0 Id. at 44.
104 Id.
'05 Id.
o Id. These items were later admitted into evidence at trial and the occupants
were convicted of armed robbery.
".. The Chambers Court, quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367
(1964), stated: "Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search
made at another place, without a warrant is simply not incident to the arrest."
399 U.S. at 47.
399 U.S. at 47-48.
109 Id. at 51 n.9.
", The Chambers Court clearly rejected the exclusive police control argument
with regard to the vehicle as a container, but in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S.
420, 424-25 (1981) (plurality opinion), the Court accepted this argument for cer-
tain containers found in the vehicle pursuant to a valid automobile exception
search. The reasoning behind this disparity rests in the Court's view in Robbins
that people have a lesser expectation of privacy as to their vehicles but not as
to certain containers. See infra notes 128-35 and accompanying text. In United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982), however, the Court voted
6-3 to reject the Robbins rationale.
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of a search warrant application.'1 In cursory fashion, the Court concluded
that:
For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the
one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable
cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out
an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to
search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment." 2
The Court's position, however, clearly flies in the face of its long-standing
warrant preference policy. " 3
In contrast, Justice Harlan's dissent expressed the belief that a "war-
rantless search involves the greater sacrifice of Fourth Amendment
values."' So that the better procedure would be to permit the "simple
seizure of the car for the period-perhaps a day-necessary to enable
the officers to obtain a search warrant.""' Such an approach would consti-
tute a lesser intrusion. Justice Harlan reasoned further that the temporary
immobilization of the vehicle would be a minimal additional inconvenience
because search probable cause will also establish arrest probable cause
and the vehicle's occupants would usually be in custody. " 6 Justice Harlan
also relied on the assumption that those not arrested would prefer tempor-
ary immobilization in exchange for having search probable cause deter-
mined by a neutral magistrate, or else they would consent to an immediate
warrantless search.
11 7
Despite Justice Harlan's viewpoint, the Chambers' majority found that
... 399 U.S. at 51.
112 Id. at 52.
See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. It is important to note here,
that the relative degree of one intrusion is simply irrelevant to the constitutional
validity of the other. Instead, constitutional scrutiny of a warrantless seizure should
be analyzed as an intrusion separate and distinct from the fourth amendment's
prohibition against warrantless searches. Otherwise, precious fourth amendment
values will be relegated to "secondary rights." See generally supra note 101.
... 399 U.S. at 63 (dissenting opinion).
115 Id.
,,' Id. at 63-64.
... Id. at 64. The difficulty with permitting the temporary warrantless seizure
of the vehicle is the potential for abusive police tactics. The police could use the
threat of temporary seizure to coerce the occupant's consent to an on-the-spot
warrantless search. However, such consent searches could be challenged as con-
sents not freely and voluntarily given as required by Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973). Moreover, the policy underlying temporary seizure is that
of preventing an additional intrusion, i.e., a warrantless search, while maintain-
ing a balance between the competing interests of prevention and detection of
crime and unwarranted governmental intrusion. The choice is between coerced
consent searches on the one hand and discretionary police power to determine
probable cause on the other. The balance should be clearly struck with the least
possible intrusion: temporary seizure pending a search warrant application.
19821
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probable cause as well as the car's mobility were still present at the police
station."' This conclusion was expressly linked to the Court's unwillingness
to preclude the use of a vehicle to anyone for a brief period of time under
the fourth amendment while a search warrant is being obtained."9 Thus,
the Court created the legal fiction of everlasting mobility from the view
that the Constitution does not exclude someone not in custody from remov-
ing an impounded vehicle. Ironically, the Chambers Court implicitly ap-
proved the temporary seizure of the Chambers vehicle from the time it
was initially stopped until, and including, the time of the delayed war-
rantless search at police headquarters." °
In 1971, a divided Court limited the applicability of the automobile ex-
ception. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,"' two vehicles were towed from
a private driveway after the owner was arrested in his nearby house.
The Coolidge Court held that the delayed search was not justified under
Carroll or Chambers because none of the exigencies of the automobile
exception were present. 2 ' Consequently, the automobile exception only
applies to vehicles impounded on public property.
In summary, the Carroll-Chambers line of cases permits government
agents to search and seize vehicles either in the field or later at the police
station. The only actual requirement is probable cause to believe the
vehicle contains contraband. Moreover, the Court has authorized warrant-
less searches of the passenger area,"' inside the seats," ' concealed com-
partments under the dash,"' under the front seat"' and in the trunk.17
2. Diminished Expectation of Privacy
In post-Chambers cases, the Court began to view the automobile in ex-
pectation of privacy terms. In Cady v. Dombrowski,"18 the warrantless
"1 399 U.S. at 52.
119 Id.
1'2 Although not discussed in Chambers, the effect of permitting delayed
searches of automobiles is to encourage more thorough searches under better
conditions. While a hasty field search might still occur after Chambers, the more
efficient search will occur at police headquarters. Effective law enforcement activ-
ities are certainly beneficial but such broad searches evoke memories of the
detestable general warrants which subdued colonial America.
403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion).
122 Id. at 460-62.
'2 Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 68 (1975).
121 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 135 (1925).
"' Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 44 (1970).
,8 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 163 (1949).
"' Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 253 (1938).
,21 413 U.S. 433 (1973). Here, an out-of-town policeman wrecked his rented car
and was subsequently hospitalized. Id. at 436. Pursuant to departmental procedure,
the police impounded the car and searched for the officer's weapon to protect
the general public. The search of the trunk revealed bloody clothes and a nightstick
and led to the search of other unrelated areas and the eventual murder convic-
tion of the policeman. Id. at 436-38.
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search and seizure of a disabled vehicle was upheld as reasonable in light
of the government's caretaking function in a rural area."9 Cady was not
decided under the automobile exception but it nonetheless provides a
significant interpretation of that exception. The Cady Court recognized
that motor vehicles have a greater exposure to police confrontations than
the inside of a home; consequently, automobiles have a lesser degree of
constitutional protection.13
In Caldwell v. Lewis,"' the Court expounded on this theme declaring
that: "One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because
its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or
as the repository of personal effects."'32 The privacy interest is further
diminished by the fact that the vehicle and its occupants are continuously
exposed to public view. ' However, these comments were made with
regard to the warrantless search of a car's exterior and the Court noted
accordingly that "[tihis is not to say that no part of the interior of an
automobile has Fourth Amendment protection."'3
The lesser expectation of privacy is clearly emerging as the underlying
rationale of the modern day automobile exception. This notion embraces
both mobility and the practicability of obtaining a warrant as pertinent
objective factors in determining the reasonableness of any expectation
of privacy. Furthermore, the Court's list of factors that affect the objec-
tive aspect of the reasonableness test is continually growing: e.g., exten-
sive traffic regulations, vehicle equipment requirements and compulsory
inspections. 13 5 These and other factors may support the conclusion that
people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to their freedom
"' The Cady Court stated that local officials have duties geared directly to
the vehicle itself that are noncriminal in nature. Characterizing these duties as
"community caretaking functions," the Court explained them as "totally divorced
from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the viola-
tion of a criminal statute." Id. at 441. Moreover, the vehicle here was properly
impounded because it was disabled and abandoned and as such was a "nuisance."
Id. at 447. The search of the car was also reasonable since it was not motivated
by a desire to find evidence; indeed, the local police did not even know at the
time that a murder had been committed. Id. at 443.
130 Id. at 439.
13' 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality opinion). Here, defendant was arrested after
questioning at the police station and the police impounded his car which was
parked in a nearby public parking lot. Id. at 587. The following day lab techni-
cians removed paint scrapings from the car's exterior and cast impressions of
the tires. Id. at 588. This evidence was used to convict defendant of vehicular
homicide.
,31 Id. at 590. The Cardwell Court applied the Chambers rationale to uphold
the seizure from a public place and the delayed warrantless search since police
could have conducted the search on the spot. Id. at 593. However, the intrusion
was not upheld under the automobile exception itself. Id. at 592 n.8.
Id. at 590.
"u Id. at 591.
"' See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979);
South Dakota v. Oppernian, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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of mobility in an automobile, but the conclusion that they likewise have
a diminished expectation of privacy in a car's interior compartments or
containers is not as compelling.
Indeed, various compartments within a vehicle, notably the glove com-
partment and luggage area, manifest the intent to conceal its contents
from public inspection. Unwarranted governmental intrusion into these
and similar portions of vehicles should be regarded as abhorrent to a free
society which depends so deeply upon its freedom of movement. While
most automobiles may not serve as temporary residences, the fact that
most vehicles are carefully selected, painstakingly maintained and often
represent a major investment, lends support to the proposition that it
is an extension of the individual and a reflection of one's personality.'36
The notion that there is a lesser expectation of privacy as to the car's
interior clearly contradicts these realities.
D. Inventory Searches
Before discussing the warrantless search of containers found in an
automobile, another automobile related warrant exception deserves men-
tion: the "inventory search exception." In South Dakota v. Opperman,'37
the Court approved the warrantless search of an impounded vehicle made
pursuant to a routine inventory of the personal effects located therein.
The vehicle had been towed to a city lot because it was parked in a
restricted zone.3 " Following departmental procedure, the personal items
in the car were listed on standard inventory forms and taken to police
headquarters for safekeeping."9 The police also opened the unlocked glove
compartment which as it turned out contained marihuana. Relying on Cady
and the caretaking responsibilities recognized there, the Opperman plurality
opted for the position that "less rigorous warrant requirements" are ap-
plicable to vehicle searches than are applicable to searches of homes and
offices.'4 °
The inventory procedure was viewed as a "routine administrative
caretaking function"'' that was not "unreasonable in scope"'4 nor a
138 See generally Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 649, 662-63 (1979). "Many people
spend more hours each day traveling in cars than walking on the streets. Un-
doubtedly, many find a greater sense of security and privacy in traveling in an
automobile .... " Id. at 662.
1 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
138 Id. at 365-66.
139 Id. at 366.
140 Id. at 367-68. The Court stated further that:
Automobiles unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing
governmental regulation and controls, including periodic inspection and
licensing requirements. As an everyday occurrence, police stop and
examine vehicles when license plates or inspection stickers have expired,
or if other violations, such as exhaust fumes or excessive noise, are noted,
or if headlights or other safety equipment are not in proper working order.
Id. at 368.
... Id. at 370 n.5.
143 Id. at 376 n.10.
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"pretext concealing an investigatory police motive.1 4 3 The search4 was
justified by the need to protect the owner's property while in custody,
to protect the government from spurious lost or stolen property claims
as well as to protect the public and police from potential danger14
The permissible scope of the inventory search according to Opperman
is limited to parts of the car customarily used to store valuables but it
is uncertain whether the trunk is such an area.146 The potential for abuse
of the inventory search is obvious. If the government is permitted, during
a routine inventory search, to search all areas of a vehicle as well as any
containers located therein, the limited protection under United States v.
Ross4" and the automobile exception will be undercut. Police will simply
conduct vehicle and container searches under the facade of the inventory
exception. In response to these dangers, many state courts are restrict-
ing inventory searches by placing a duty on police to offer the owner,
when known, an option of releasing the government from tort liability
for lost or stolen items in lieu of an inventory search. 48 In addition, other
states are requiring police to have the owner present during the search
or to permit the owner to make other arrangements to protect his per-
sonal property.149
Opperman also leaves open the question of whether containers found
during an inventory search can be opened and inventoried as well. The
degradation of fourth amendment rights is particularly frightening here,
especially in view of the various traffic code violations that could be used
as a pretext to get the vehicle into the station in the first place. However,
in United States v. Chadwick,1" discussed in the next Section, the Court
emitted a ray of hope by declaring that there is a greater expectation
of privacy regarding closed containers than there is in the automobile
itself. Since Chadwick does not deal with an inventory search with a non-
investigatory motive, a few states have found it not applicable and have
upheld the inventorying of the container's contents.'' Fortunately, a clear
majority of the lower courts are applying the Chadwick rationale to in-
validate the opening of containers pursuant to an inventory search.'52
III. SEARCHING CLOSED CONTAINERS LOCATED WITHIN A VEHICLE
In the 1977 case of United States v. Chadwick,1 53 the Court had its first
143 Id. at 376.
144 Notably, only Justice Powell had properly categorized the inventory pro-
cedure as a "search" since it intruded "upon an area in which the private citizen
has a 'reasonable expectation of privacy.' " Id. at 377 n.1 (concurring opinion).
145 Id. at 369.
14 Id. at 376 n.10.
14 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
148 See LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 168 n.40 (Supp. 1982), for a list of state cases.
149 Id.
5 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
151 See LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 170 nn.70-71 (Supp. 1982).
152 Id. at 170-71 n.72.
153 433 U.S. 1 (1977). See also Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
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opportunity to explore the legal implications of warrantless searches and
seizures of closed containers fortuitously located within a motor vehicle.
The Carroll-Chambers line of cases discussed above dealt only with the
warrantless search of the vehicle itself where police had merely general
knowledge that contraband was contained somewhere therein. Chadwick,
on the other hand, deals with the situation where police have specific
information that a particular container which happens to be located in
a motor vehicle contains incriminating matter. ' Thus, the focus of
Chadwick-type searches is limited to the container, not the vehicle itself.
Post-Chadwick cases made this distinction important because of the dif-
ferent results in the application of the appropriate legal doctrine. As the
law now stands, Chadwick-type searches cannot be made without a war-
rant, unless the container is within the "immediate control" of an arrestee
in which case a warrantless search may be permissible, under New York
v. Belton,55 as a search incident to a lawful arrest. However, if the con-
tainer is discovered during a lawful automobile exception search, based
on probable cause of a general nature, and not conducted as a search inci-
dent to an arrest, then a warrantless search is permissible under United
States v. Ross."
Prior to Ross, the general/specific information distinction seemed to be
a nullity since both Chadwick and Robbins v. California 57 required a search
warrant before a container found in a vehicle could be searched. In Ross,
however, the Court abandoned Robbins and extended the automobile ex-
ception to validate warrantless searches of containers found in a vehicle
where there was reason to believe, based on general information, that
there was contraband somewhere in the vehicle.1  Thus, the general/specific
information distinction remains viable and warrantless container searches
are prohibited only in two seemingly anomalous situations: 1) where police
have specific information that a particular container contains evidence,
despite its location in a vehicle; and 2) where the police lack probable
cause to search the vehicle in general and the search would not be inci-
dent to a valid arrest. This Section will analyze the rationale behind this
distinction.
A. Chadwick and Sanders Situations
In United States v. Chadwick, federal narcotics agents received a tip
from railroad officials that two individuals loaded a brown footlocker onto
a Boston bound train. 9 The railroad officials suspected that illicit drugs
were being transported because talcum powder, commonly used to cover-
15 433 U.S. at 3-4.
15 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
11 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
157 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion), overruled, United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, -, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1982).
1 456 U.S. at , 102 S. Ct. at 2172.
159 433 U.S. 1, 3 (1977).
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up marihuana odor, was seen leaking from the trunk and because the
weight of the trunk was disproportionate to its size. 6 ' Two days later
the train arrived in Boston and federal agents followed the suspects as
they claimed the footlocker and were joined by Chadwick."' A trained
police dog was discreetly released near the footlocker and the dog signalled
that a controlled substance was in the container.' The three suspects
then placed the footlocker in the trunk of Chadwick's waiting automobile,
but before the car was even started, all three were arrested and the
footlocker was seized."l5 A few hours later at the federal building, the
agents opened the double-locked footlocker and discovered a large quan-
tity of marihuana.' The arrests and search were made without warrants,
the trunk was within the government's exclusive control at all times follow-
ing the arrests and the agents did not contend that exigent circumstances
justified the search.6 5 The government asserted that the automobile ex-
ception rationale as applied in Chambers, as well as the search incident
to arrest exception, justified their actions; however, the district and circuit
courts disagreed and the evidence was suppressed."6
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments below and rejected the
government's broad propositions.'67 As to the search incident to arrest
exception, the Chadwick Court held that a prompt warrantless search was
limited by Chimel to the "arrestee's person and the area 'within his imme-
diate control.' ""6 Such a search is justified only to prevent the destruc-
tion of evidence and to protect police from bodily harm.'69 The trunk here,
according to the Chadwick majority, was not "immediately associated"
with the arrestee's person and, once it was reduced to the agent's ex-
clusive control, any threatened danger of access by the arrestees to it
or its contents was dissipated. 7 ' Furthermore, the Court stated that such
160 Id.
"' Id. at 3-4.
162 Id. at 4.
163 Id.
"' Id. at 4-5.
165 Id.
16 Id. at 5-6.
167 Id. at 6-7. In one such proposition, the government claimed that any prop-
erty possessed by a person arrested in public could be searched without a war-
rant as incident to the arrest "so long as there is probable cause to believe that
the property contains contraband or evidence of crime." Id. at 14. While the govern-
ment conceded that the Chimel immediate control requirement was not present
here, they reasoned instead that the delayed search was reasonable on practicability
grounds. Id. The Court correctly determined that this argument was not pertinent
to the search incident justifications. Id.
161 Id. at 14 (citations omitted).
169 Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 15. Compare Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, id. at 16, that the
police could not have made an immediate search of the footlocker no matter how
much control defendants' had, because the double-lock prevented exercise of "im-
mediate control" and access to the contents; with Justice Blackmun's dissenting
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a delayed search is too "'remote in time [and] place from the arrest,'"
and is not justified as incident thereto. "' Consequently, a search warrant
is required whenever property of this type is "under the exclusive domin-
ion of police authority.""17
The Chadwick majority rejected the government's other contention that
core fourth amendment interests were historically erected only to pro-
tect homes, offices and private communications through the warrant re-
quirement, and that warrantless government intrusions of other areas,
such as automobiles, would be reasonable if supported by probable cause.'73
Instead, Chadwick held that the fourth amendment safeguards "individuals
from unreasonable government invasions of legitimate privacy interests"
even outside of the home.' The Chadwick Court further maintained that:
"By placing personal effects inside a double-locked footlocker, respondents
manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free from public
examination."'7 In addition, the government's automobile analogy was
distinguished on the grounds that a vehicle has a "diminished expecta-
tion of privacy" because it is not a home or a repository of personal ef-
fects where privacy is legitimately expected.'76
opinion, id. at 18-20, which contends that under Robinson the trunk could have
been searched on the scene or delayed until later as in Edwards.
.1 Id. at 15 (citation omitted). The Court noted, however, that a delayed search
may be valid if the exigency of the situation so dictates; for example, if the lug-
gage contains explosives or other immediately dangerous instrumentalities. Id.
at n.9. However, such a search should be upheld under the exigent circumstances
exception, not the search incident exception. See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23, 39-40 (1962).
" 433 U.S. at 15. The validity of the initial seizure and detention of the trunk
was not challenged here; nonetheless, this procedure was implicitly approved as
"sufficient to guard against any risk that evidence might be lost." Id. at 13 (dic-
tum). Further dicta indicated that the warrantless impoundment or immobiliza-
tion of the container was a "substantial infringement" with the use and posses-
sion of the footlocker, and that the "seizure did not diminish" the expectation
of privacy in the contents. Id. at 13 n.8.
Indeed, in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), the Court upheld the tem-
porary seizure of a container while a magistrate determined the sufficiency of
a search warrant application. Id. at 765 n.14. The Sanders Court distinguished
the reluctance of the Chambers Court to grant such a procedure with regard to
automobiles on the ground that temporary impoundment of containers does not
impose severe burdens on the police department as does the temporary impound-
ment of vehicles. Id. In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, __, 102 S. Ct. 2157,
2172 (1982), however, the Court further limited the Sanders temporary seizure
rationale to non-automobile exception searches where the object of the search
is the container, not the vehicle.
' 433 U.S. at 6-7, 11-13. This argument relied on the automobile exception
by analogy. Yet, the government did not contend that the footlocker's brief con-
tact with the vehicle invoked the automobile exception per se, thereby leaving
the question open for another case.
.. Id. at 11.
175 Id.
16 Id. at 12.
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In 1979, in Arkansas v. Sanders,'77 the Court was confronted with the
warrantless search and seizure of an unlocked suitcase belonging to a
passenger in a taxi.' 78 As was the case in Chadwick, the Sanders officers
had probable cause to believe the suitcase, as opposed to the vehicle, con-
tained contraband. '79 This specific information thus limited the scope of
the search to a particular container, the suitcase, coincidentally located
in a motor vehicle. Sanders differed from Chadwick in that the vehicle
travelled two blocks before being stopped by police and the warrantless
Sanders search occurred on the spot. The Sanders Court held that the
location of the suitcase in a moving vehicle did not lessen Sanders'
legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of his luggage, and that
the exigency of the suitcase's mobility, vis-a-vis its location, disappeared
once securely within police control." Consequently, the warrantless search
of the suitcase was held invalid.
The difficulty with the Sanders holding was the disagreement among
the Justices as to its scope. On the one hand, the broad interpretation
stated above led to the conclusion that the warrantless search of a con-
tainer could never be valid under the automobile exception."' Chief Justice
Burger, in his concurring opinion which was joined by Justice Stevens,
stated that the automobile exception is not operable here because police
had specific knowledge that a particular container located in the vehicle
contained contraband." Thus, for Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens
the specific versus general knowledge distinction remained meaningful
and the question was still open whether a warrantless search of a container
found during a lawful automobile exception search is reasonable. Moreover,
two years later in Robbins Justice Powell, who authored the Sanders ma-
jority opinion, stated that neither Chadwick nor Sanders was an "auto-
mobile case" because of the specific nature of the probable cause.'
Nonetheless, this dilemma was resolved in United States v. Ross,'84 where
the Court upheld a warrantless container search under the automobile
exception and rejected that portion of Sanders which could be construed
17 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
178 Id. at 755.
Id. Acting upon information from a reliable informant, local police observed
the suspect arrive at the airport, carrying a suitcase believed to contain marihuana,
and later enter a cab with an apparent co-conspirator. Id.
180 Id. at 763. In dissent, Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist opined that once
the container is seized the "additional intrusion of a search may well be regarded
as incidental" and a search warrant would only add minimal protection. Id. at 770.
, Id. at 763.
182 Id. at 767 (concurring opinion).
83 453 U.S. 420, 435 (1981) (concurring opinion). However, at least three federal
circuit courts found that Sanders compelled the invalidation of an automobile ex-
ception/container search. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1168 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (en banc), rev'd, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); United States v.
Medina-Verduzo, 637 F.2d 649, 652-53 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Stevie,
582 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 911 (1979).
184 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
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to invalidate such a warrantless search. 5 Thus, a warrantless container
search is valid under Ross if based on general information, but is invalid
under Chadwick and Sanders if based on specific information regarding
a particular container.
Chadwick and Sanders left open two other issues. First, whether the
search incident to arrest exception permits the warrantless search of con-
tainers seized from the car's passenger compartment following the occu-
pant's arrest. In Chadwick, this exception was argued in an attempt to
uphold the delayed search of the footlocker, but the Court flatly rejected
it on grounds of remoteness in time from the arrest.' In Sanders, the
argument was not asserted at all in support of the on-the-spot search of
the suitcase taken from the trunk. Nonetheless, the Sanders Court stated
that the luggage was not within the arrestee's "immediate control" at
the time of the search.8 7
Chadwick and Sanders also left the question open as to which containers
do not manifest a legitimate expectation of privacy. Footnote 13 of the
Sanders opinion is the center of the controversy here.' The footnote in-
dicates in general terms that two types of containers "cannot support
any reasonable expectation of privacy ' and are thus not protected by
the fourth amendment: 1) open containers with contents exposed to plain
view; and 2) those containers with contents inferrable from the nature
of the container. The Ross Court, however, rejected this rationale in the
automobile exception context and held that the nature of the container
does not define the scope of the warrantless search; instead, the object
of the search and the place in which there is probable cause that contra-
band might be concealed therein are the relevant guideposts.'"8
B. New York v. Belton
1. A New "Bright Line" Rule
In New York v. Belton,' the Court applied the Chimel "immediate con-
trol" test and created a new "bright line" rule to validate warrantless
automobile searches made contemporaneously with the lawful arrest of
its occupants. In Belton, a lone state policeman pulled over an automobile
for speeding on a thruway. While checking for identification he smelled
burnt marihuana and saw an envelope on the car floor marked "Super-
185 Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2172. See infra text accompanying notes 284-87.
1 See generally supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
.87 442 U.S. 753, 763 n.11 (1979) (dictum). But see New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454 (1981) (upholding the warrantless search of a container taken from the
passenger compartment where the container was deemed within the arrestee's
immediate control).
18 Id. at 764 n.13.
Id. The Court cited a gun case and a kit of burglar tools as examples of
this type of unprotected container.
456 U.S. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2172.
191 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
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gold." ' The officer immediately associated the marked envelope with il-
licit drugs and ordered the four occupants out of the car, arrested them
for unlawful possession of marihuana, frisked each of them and separated
them into different areas on the highway. 9 ' The trooper then retrieved
and opened the envelope discovering marihuana.9 4 After reading the ar-
restees the Miranda warnings, he returned to the vehicle and searched
the passenger compartment finding a jacket on the back seat. '95 He seized
the jacket, unzipped one of the pockets and discovered cocaine.196
Writing for the majority,'9 Justice Stewart upheld the warrantless
search of the zipped pocket as incident to a lawful arrest. Justice Stewart
held that the Chimel standard, which authorizes the contemporaneous
search of " 'the area within the immediate control of an arrestee,'" is
applicable to situations where the arrestee was a recent occupant of an
automobile.199 Clearly the occupants here were placed under custodial
arrest' before the search so that the next question was whether the jacket
in the car's passenger compartment was an area within the arrestee's
"immediate control.' 9 9
Justice Stewart acknowledged the need for a "workable rule"" because
lower courts had reached inconsistent results in defining that area of an
automobile within the arrestee's reach. Based upon his reading of the
cases, Justice Stewart formulated the "generalization that articles inside
the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an
192 Id. at 455-56.
Id. at 456.
194 Id.
Id.
19 Id. The jacket belonged to Belton who was subsequently indicted for posses-
sion of a controlled substance. His motion to suppress the cocaine was denied
so Belton plead guilty to a lesser included offense but preserved his claim for
appeal. Id. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, upheld the war-
rantless intrusion on the grounds that the jacket was within Belton's "immediate
area" and the search was therefore valid as incident to the arrest. Id. The New
York Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the zipped pocket was unaccessible
to the arrestee and the intrusion was therefore beyond the scope of the search
incident exception. Id.
19, The Belton opinion is characterized herein as a majority opinion only with
great caution. Justices Brennan, Marshall and White clearly dissented while Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Powell agreed on the ration-
ale. However, Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment only because of his
belief that the automobile exception should be used to uphold such searches. Id.
at 463 (concurring opinion). Like Justice Stevens, Justice Rehnquist was inclined
to uphold the search under the automobile exception but reluctantly concurred
in the Court's opinion. Id. Thus, a clear majority would uphold the search, however,
a majority seemed to be emerging to validate it under the automobile exception
rather than the search incident to arrest exception.
199 Id. at 460. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
19 The validity of the arrest was not challenged here. Id. at 462.
Id. at 460.
201 Id.
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automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within 'the area
into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or eviden-
tiary item.'"202 Justice Stewart then read Chimel's limits in light of this
generalization and created the per se rule "that when a policeman has
made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may,
as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger com-
partment of that automobile." ' 3
Justice Stewart further reasoned that "if the passenger compartment
is within reach of the arrestee" then so are containers therein. 4 While
this conclusion may follow as a general rule, Justice Stewart made the
quantum leap, without any factual analysis, that the contents of containers
are likewise an area within which an arrestee might reach.0 ' Instead, he
analyzed the access to the contents problem in terms of privacy interests
which Chimel held to be outweighed by the significant government in-
terests of police safety and preservation of evidence when the seized item
was within the immediate control area."' Consequently, Belton held that
the passenger compartment and any containers0 7 located therein, as well
as the container's contents, are per se within the spatial limits of Chimel
and thereby subject to warrantless searches.
The majority suggested that this per se or "bright line" rule is necessary
to provide straightforward guidelines for law enforcement officials.0 0
Justice Powell's concurrence cogently pointed out the harsh realities and
dangers of custodial arrests under Belton-type circumstances. For Justice
Powell, the confrontation between the arresting officer and an arrestee
apprehended on a public highway presents a "volatile and fluid situation,"
and the "practical necessities" of freeing police from having to make close
and hasty calculations in such situations clearly outweigh the marginal
cost to privacy interests. 9 Consequently, the broad scope of the Belton
202 Id. (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). Moreover, by
analogy to the rationale in Robinson-type searches of the arrestee's person, Justice
Stewart stated that it was irrelevant whether a container within that area "could
hold neither a weapon nor evidence of the criminal conduct for which the suspect
was arrested." Id. at 460-61. Rather, the sole justification for the warrantless
search is the fact of the lawful custodial arrest. Id. at 461. See generally supra
notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
23 453 U.S. at 460 (footnotes omitted). Notably, Justice Stewart pointed out
that the holding here "does not encompass the trunk" as an area within arrestee's
"immediate control." Id. at 460-61 n.4. Furthermore, Belton adhered to the Chimel
time limit: contemporaneousness.
'' Id. at 460.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 461.
207 Id. According to Belton, a "container" is "any object capable of holding
another object .. .[including] closed or open glove compartments, consoles, or
other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger compartment, as well
as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like." Id. at 460-61 n.4.
20' Id. at 459-60. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 430-31 (1981) (where
Justice Powell explained his concurrence in Belton).
Robbins, 453 U.S. at 431 (Powell, J., concurring).
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search was dictated by the underlying justifications, as in Robinson, rather
than by a careful application of the Chimel limits.
2. Potential Abuse
In dissent, Justice Brennan rightly pointed out that the rule established
here is an unjustified and "dangerous precedent" that disregards the
Chimel standards which were "narrowly tailored" to redress a similarly
tenuous situation. 10 Justice Brennan commented that the fourth amend-
ment cannot be discarded for the mere purpose of making law enforce-
ment more efficient."' For Justice Brennan, the rule also "fails on its own
terms" and does not provide workable guidelines for police to determine
its limits.21 Moreover, Justice Brennan refused to adopt the "fiction"
established here "that the interior of a car is always within the immediate
control of an arrestee who has recently been in the car."" 3
The Belton per se rule is highly susceptible to potential abuse. Under
this rule, probable cause to search is not required, only probable cause
to arrest is a prerequisite. However, probable cause to support an arrest
is rarely determined by a neutral and detached magistrate pursuant to
an arrest warrant application. An arrest warrant is not needed for ar-
rests made pursuant to any crime committed in a policeman's presence
nor for felonies not committed in his presence but where probable cause
to arrest exists." ' Applying these established principles to the occupants
of a car, an arrest warrant will not be needed under most circumstances
since vehicles inevitably appear on public thoroughfares.
Indeed, the patrolman in Belton could have arrested the driver without
a warrant for the traffic violation which occurred in his presence and
in public. Under Belton, the passenger compartment and any containers
therein could have been searched on the sole justification of the lawful
traffic arrest,"' without regard to the existence of search probable cause.
20 453 U.S. at 464-66, 468 (dissenting opinion). See Robbins, 453 U.S. at 449-50
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (the Belton approach, as opposed to the automobile ex-
ception approach, is an "extraordinary dangerous detour").
2 453 U.S. at 469 (dissenting opinion).
2 Id. at 469-70. Justice Brennan pointed out that more problems are created
than solved; for example, how long after the arrest may the search be validly
conducted and is it relevant how close to the car the suspect is when the search
is made. Id. Cf. People v. Riegler, 127 Cal. App. 3d 317, 323-24, 179 Cal. Rptr.
530, 533-34 (1981) (distinguished Belton since search was delayed five hours and
container was in exclusive police control).
21 453 U.S. at 466.
214 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). See also Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103 (1975), in which the Court required an ex parte hearing as soon
as possible after a warrantless arrest to retain judicial determination of probable
cause for extended incarceration.
21' Compare Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 264 (1973) (where the authority
to search a person pursuant to a lawful arrest is per se reasonable regardless
of the degree of the offense) and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)
(search of arrestee valid pursuant to arrest for traffic violation). In short, the
reason for the search is unconnected to the nature of the offense and the search
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In fact, many state statutes give police the discretion to arrest a driver
without a warrant for certain minor traffic violations or vehicle equip-
ment violations.1 6 Furthermore, Belton offers no guidelines as to whether
other occupants or their belongings may be searched where only a fellow
occupant is formally under arrest. The combined effect of Belton and exist-
ing warrantless arrest rules shifts far-reaching discretionary powers from
the magistrate to the policeman in the field."'
Traffic related violations might also be used by unscrupulous officers
as a pretext for a general search pursuant to a lawful arrest."8 Notably,
the burden of proving the pretext would be on the citizen and would be
a difficult hurdle to overcome. Even assuming that most law enforcement
agents act in good faith and would not use traffic violations as a pretext
for general searches, the mere fact that police officers are government
agents "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime"
warrants caution. 9 Despite taking an oath to uphold the Constitution,
police are in a position that is neither neutral or detached, and it is
unrealistic to expect total objectivity from an adversarial party.220
Furthermore, the traffic violation pretense is not needed where police
have a valid arrest warrant for criminal charges. Belton now enables police
to gain an advantage over the arrestee by staking-out his vehicle, follow-
ing him when he drives away and stopping him down the road to execute
the warrant and conduct a contemporaneous search of the passenger com-
partment as incident to the lawful arrest. This is the precise evil the
Chimel Court sought to overcome where police waited for the arrestee
to arrive home in order to execute the arrest warrant and search the
entire house without a warrant.71 Evidently, the Belton Court chose to
is valid even though no additional evidence relating to the charges could possibly
be found on the arrestee.
216 For a sampling of such state laws see Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420,
451 n.12 (1981) (dissenting opinion). But see Folk, The Case for Constitutional Con-
straints Upon the Power to Make Full Custody Arrests, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 321
(1979) (discusses validity of state statutes giving police such discretionary arrest
powers).
217 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text regarding the Court's
heretofore cherished warrant preference. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967) ("[Slearches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable .... "); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (the point of fourth amendment protection is that
"inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate").
28 Some courts have stated that searches incident to arrests for traffic viola-
tions will not be permitted where the arrest was but a pretext for the search.
See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 321 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1963); Taglavore v. United
States, 291 F.2d 269 (9th Cir. 1961); Henderson v. United States, 12 F.2d 528 (4th
Cir. 1926).
219 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (footnote omitted).
Id. As Justice Jackson warned, uncontrolled searches and seizures are
dangerous weapons that could be used in "cowing a population, crushing the spirit
of the individual and putting terror in every heart." Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 180 (dissenting opinion). See also supra note 101.
21 See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
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disregard these prior teachings simply because there is a lesser expecta-
tion of privacy in a motor vehicle than in a home.
3. A Recommendation
Belton's "bright line" rule was designed to maintain the status quo,
in what is certainly a volatile police-citizen confrontation, by not requir-
ing police to make on-the-spot expectation of privacy determinations. Such
a goal is admirable and proper but not to the extent adopted in Belton.
Notably, the Belton custodial arrest situation differs significantly from
the custodial arrest encounter in United States v. Robinson.222 In Robin-
son, the Court created a per se rule allowing the warrantless search of
an arrestee's person and any containers closely associated with his
person.' The underlying premise was that police safety justified an across
the board rule because the arrestee would pose a continuing threat of
danger while in transit to police headquarters. Out of deference to police
safety, any subjective on the spot determination of actual danger would
be too burdensome. In effect, Belton treated the passenger compartment
and the contents of containers therein as items closely associated with
the arrestee's person as in Robinson. This is true even though the Belton
majority cloaked the rule in Chimel "immediate control" terminology. Such
a leap seems wholly inconsistent with the varying degrees of exigency
present in Belton and Robinson-type situations, respectively.
The critical difference between Robinson and Belton exigencies is that
the passenger compartment did not pose a continuing threat to police
safety, as the arrestee did in Robinson, because it is not transported to
the station with the arrestee. Consequently, the exigency posed by access
to the arrestee's vehicle is shorter in duration and does not compel the
far-reaching rule posited in Belton. Instead, the facts of the Belton arrest
suggest a less intrusive means of safeguarding fourth amendment rights
while neutralizing such volatile encounters. Accordingly, the "bright line"
in Belton should have been drawn at the warrantless seizure of the jacket.
The additional intrusion of a warrantless search of seized containers
should not be determined by a per se rule; rather, exclusive police con-
trol over the object, as in Sanders, should be the determinative criterion
upon which a subsequent warrantless intrusion should depend. Justice
Stewart expressly rejected the exclusive control argument made in Belton,
however, because in his view "under this fallacious theory no search or
seizure incident to a lawful custodial arrest would ever be valid." '24
Although, as Justice Brennan pointed out, such a view erroneously
assumes that an item once in police hands is always within their exclusive
control."
222 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
223 Id. at 235-36. See also supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
453 U.S. at 461-62 n.5.
Id. at 471 n.5 (dissenting opinion). "[E]xclusive control means.., sufficient
control such that there is no significant risk that the arrestee or his confederates
'might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.'" Id. (citation omitted).
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The exclusive control concept is simply another way of stating that
something is no longer within the reach of an arrestee. The question then
becomes whether there is a legitimate expectation of privacy in the con-
tainer once removed from the unprotected Chimel zone. Such a question
would turn on the same principle announced in Sanders and adopted by
the plurality in Robbins v. Californiain the automobile exception con-
text: the privacy expectation in closed containers taken from a vehicle
is not less than the privacy expectation in closed containers found
elsewhere."6 Thus, the result would be the same under either warrant
exception.
In short, the better rule would be to treat the passenger compartment
and containers therein as always within the Chimel permissible search
limits, as did the Belton Court, where the arrestee has not been removed
from the area immediately surrounding the vehicle or otherwise signifi-
cantly precluded access to the vehicle. Therefore, a search of the vehicle's
interior that occurs after the arrestee is securely in custody in the patrol
car or otherwise removed from the immediate vicinity would be invalid
as not contemporaneous with the arrest. In addition, where the rule has
been triggered by the arrestee's close proximity to the vehicle, the war-
rantless search of the passenger compartment and the warrantless seizure
of containers therein would be per se reasonable by the Court's previously
expressed view that there is a lesser expectation of privacy in motor
vehicles.22 Consequently, state courts should limit Belton to permit the
warrantless seizure of a container taken from a vehicle under the search
incident to arrest exception, unless the contents are within the arrestee's
immediate control, by liberally construing their state constitutions. The
rule recommended here would maintain the status quo on an intermediate
level and prevent the removal of evidence as well as defuse a potentially
dangerous situation while preserving the sacred fourth amendment pro-
hibition against warrantless searches.
C. Robbins v. California
Curtails the Automobile Exception
While the Court did not reach the automobile exception issue in New
York v. Belton,22 s it did address that question in Robbins v. California, 29
where Justice Stewart, writing for a plurality,23 invalidated the war-
22' 453 U.S. at 424-25. See also supra notes 177-89 and accompanying text, and
infra notes 234-42 and accompanying text.
22 See also supra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
211 453 U.S. 454, 462-63 n.6 (1981).
21 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion).
230 Justices Brennan, White and Marshall joined Stewart's plurality opinion,
while Justices Stevens, Rehnquist and Blackmun dissented, id. at 421, and Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Powell concurred in the judgment only, id. at 429.
However, Justice Powell's concurrence does form a majority opinion to a limited
extent; namely, he supports the plurality's "bright line" rule to the extent that
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rantless search of a container lawfully seized from the luggage compart-
ment of a station wagon pursuant to the automobile exception. 31 In Rob-
bins, highway patrol officers pulled over an old station wagon being driven
erratically." The driver, Robbins, immediately exited the car and walked
toward the police cruiser; when he reentered the vehicle to get his
registration card, one patrolman smelled marihuana smoke coming from
the car." A subsequent frisk of Robbins uncovered a vial of liquid and
a subsequent search of the passenger compartment revealed marihuana
and drug paraphernalia."M After Robbins was put securely in the cruiser,
the officers returned to the car and searched a recessed luggage com-
partment which contained a "totebag and two packages wrapped in green
opaque plastic."' Police unwrapped the packages and seized thirty pounds
of marihuana.23
In invalidating the warrantless search, Justice Stewart interpreted
United States v. Chadwick and Arkansas v. Sanders broadly to uphold the
expectation of privacy associated with certain containers located within
an automobile, which does have a diminished expectation of privacy. 7
a search warrant is required for those containers which manifest a reasonable
expectation of privacy, i.e., worthy containers. Id. However, for Justice Powell,
the plurality goes too far when "insubstantial containers" are included within
the rule. Id.
231 Id. at 428-29. The state did not argue that the search was valid as incident
to a lawful arrest. Id. at 429 n.3. Under Belton, however, the warrantless search
of a recessed luggage compartment would be invalid generally since it is an area
not within the arrestee's immediate control. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. In addition,
once the arrestee was placed under custody in the police cruiser, as in Robbins,
the return to the suspect's vehicle to conduct a search would arguably not be
contemporaneous with the arrest. Id.
23 453 U.S. at 422.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id. (footnote omitted).
23 Id. Defendant's pretrial motion to suppress the marihuana was denied and
he was convicted of various drug offenses with this evidence. The judgment was
affirmed by the California Court of Appeals but was later vacated and remanded
by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753 (1979). On remand, the warrantless search was upheld again since it
was deemed that Robbins could not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the packages because the contents could reasonably have been "inferred from
their outward appearance." Id. at 423.
23 453 U.S. at 426-28. Thus, for the plurality the distinction of general versus
specific probable cause was foreclosed by Sanders. Yet, for Justice Powell the
result here is not necessarily compelled by Sanders since that was not an
automobile search case. Id. at 432 (concurring opinion). Similarly, Chief Justice
Burger's concurrence in the judgment only here signaled his apparent willingness
to recognize this general/specific knowledge distinction. Furthermore, the
dissenters, Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun and Stevens, would hold that Sanders
is not applicable. Id. at 444-46 (dissenting opinion). Prior to Stewart's retirement
then, four Justices (Brennan, Marshall, White and Stewart) would not uphold the
distinction, while four others (Burger, Stevens, Rehnquist and Blackmun) would
recognize it, leaving Justices Powell and O'Connor as possible swing votes. Thus,
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Justice Stewart also noted that the problem of mobility is nonexistent
once the container is controlled exclusively by police.' In addition, Justice
Stewart rejected the state's "unworthy container" contention that "only
containers commonly used to transport 'personal effects'" would be fully
protected and that the "nature" of the container would control the degree
of fourth amendment protection.2" Instead, Justice Stewart counseled that
"effects" are neither "personal" nor "impersonal" and are entitled to equal
fourth amendment protection if the container in which "effects" are placed
manifests a reasonable expectation of privacy. 40 As to the sealed opaque
container in Robbins, the record did not establish that the green plastic
wrapping is typically used to package marihuana to negate any legitimate
expectation of privacy.24" '
Justice Powell agreed with Justice Stewart concerning Robbins' mani-
fested expectation of privacy in this particular package, but parted with
the plurality regarding the extension of the Sanders rationale to all
containers.242 Justice Powell would not require warrants to search "insub-
stantial containers in which no one had a reasonable expectation of
privacy."' ' Moreover, Justice Powell viewed this case as a "container case"
like Chadwick and Sanders, and he opined that the automobile exception
is inapplicable because the "police had probable cause to search the con-
tainer rather than the automobile generally." '44 Justice Powell also stated
that the plurality's per se warrant requirement disregarded the principles
of Katz v. United States and Sanders which require case-by-case adjudica-
tion on the question of reasonable expectation of privacy. 4 '
In dissent, Justice Blackmun conceded that the plurality's rule does
establish a "bright line," but the clearer approach would be to permit
the warrantless search and seizure of "any personal property found in
it is not surprising that, in United State4 v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157
(1982), the Court abandoned the plurality's rationale and expressly adopted the
general/specific knowledge distinction with only Justices Brennan, Marshall and
White dissenting. See infra notes 265-83 and accompanying text.
' 453 U.S. at 424-25. Notably, Justice Stewart rejected this argument in Belton
in the search incident to arrest context. Belton, 453 U.S. at 461-62 n.5.
"' Id. at 425-26. The state's argument was based on footnote 13 in Sanders
which indicated that containers from which the contents could be inferred from
its outward appearance "cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy."
Id. at 427. Justice Stewart recanted that footnote 13 merely explained how the
"plain view" doctrine operates to obviate the need for a search warrant where
a container is open to public view or where the "distinctive configuration" or
"transparency" of the container "clearly announce its contents." Id.
2. Id. at 426.
241 Id. at 427-28.
.2 Id. at 432-33 (concurring opinion).
243 Id. at 429. Furthermore, Justice Powell believes that "substantial burdens"
would be imposed on "law enforcement without vindicating any significant values
of privacy." Id.
244 Id. at 432.
245 Id. at 432-33.
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an automobile" pursuant to the Carroll-Chambers automobile exception.2"'
Justice Rehnquist also argued that such searches should be permissible
under the automobile exception." The plurality's rule, according to Justice
Rehnquist, merely "compounds the evils of the 'exclusionary rule' by
engrafting subtleties" into fourth amendment law. 48 Justice Stevens also
favored use of the automobile exception to validate the warrantless
searches in both Belton and Robbins.2" Moreover, Justice Stevens stated
that use of the automobile exception alone in Belton and Robbins situa-
tions would be a "shorter step" adhering to the "fundamental distinction"
of validating a warrantless search based on probable cause, that a magi-
strate could have authorized, as opposed to the search incident to arrest
exception which is not based on probable cause and could not have been
authorized by a magistrate.2"
The varying viewpoints expressed in Robbins clearly undercut Justice
Stewart's attempt to establish a "bright line" rule for warrantless searches
of containers seized under a valid automobile exception search. Robbins
not only failed to put the general/specific information distinction to rest,
but it inadvertently gave it new life. Indeed, Justice Powell invalidated
the search in Robbins according to this Chadwick-Sanders distinction
because he viewed Robbins as a container search case based on probable
cause to believe that a particular container concealed illicit drugs."2 ' The
Louisiana Supreme Court drew on this disparity recently and distinguished
Robbins as a container case that does not preclude the warrantless search
of a container within a vehicle when only based upon general information. "
Perhaps in recognition of this disparity, the United States Supreme Court
ordered reconsideration of Robbins in United States v. Ross.2"
IV. United States v. Ross: RECONSIDERATION OF Robbins
The rationale of the plurality in Robbins v. California2" was abandoned
by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Ross.' The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had invalidated the
warrantless search in Ross of a closed brown paper bag and a zippered
leather pouch lawfully seized from a trunk under the automobile excep-
246 Id. at 436-37 (dissenting opinion).
247 Id. at 439-41 (dissenting opinion).
2. Id. at 437.
Id. at 444 (dissenting opinion).
22 Id. at 452-53.
251 Id. at 432 (concurring opinion). In fact, Justice Powell indicated that the
plurality decided this case based on the "assumption that the police had probable
cause to search the container rather than the automobile generally." Id.
252 State v. Hernandez, 408 So.2d 911, 916-17 (La.) (court believed that five out
of the eight remaining Robbins' Justices would uphold this search under the
automobile exception), cert. denied, - U.S. ., 103 S. Ct. 90 (1982).
2m 454 U.S. 891 (1981).
24 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
252 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
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tion.12 However, the circuit court had relied on Arkansas v. Sanders to
suppress the evidence since Robbins had not yet been decided."' The
Supreme Court, recognizing the "importance of striving for clarification
in this area of the law," granted the petition for certiorari.25
In Ross, a reliable informant telephoned police that a man nicknamed
"Bandit" was selling narcotics from the trunk of his car. 59 Three police
officers located the suspect and a radio check revealed that the owner,
Ross, was also known as "Bandit.""26 The subsequent search of the trunk
revealed an unsealed brown paper bag alongside a zippered leather pouch,
but only the bag, which contained glassine envelopes full of white powder,
was opened at this point. 6' The containers were returned to the trunk
and the car was transported to the police station where a thorough search
disclosed money in the pouch and heroin in the paper bag."2
The circuit court majority applied the Sanders reasonable expectation
of privacy test and found the warrantless search of both the bag and pouch
invalid. This result, according to the majority, was compelled by the
Sanders mandate' that the focus of police suspicion was irrelevant.' Con-
sequently, the fact that police may only have general information that
contraband is somewhere in the vehicle as opposed to being located within
a particular container is a distinction Sanders laid to rest.2 5 Thus, the
256 655 F.2d 1159, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc). The search incident to arrest
exception was also argued but was rejected since the seized containers were
located out of defendant's "immediate control" in the trunk. Id. at 1169. The same
result would have occurred under Belton's "bright line" rule since only the
passenger compartment was deemed per se within an arrestee's reach. New York
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
257 655 F.2d at 1168.
258 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
259 Id. at __, 102 S. Ct. at 2162. The informant did not specify any containers
but he did give a detailed description of the car and Ross. Id. at __, 102 S.
Ct. at 2160. Consequently, the Court was squarely confronted with an automobile
search based only upon general information that the vehicle contained contra-
band not any specific container.
I Id. at __, 102 S. Ct. at 2160.
261 Id.
.62 Id. A pretrial motion to suppress the heroin and the money was denied
and Ross was convicted of possession of narcotics with the intent to distribute. Id.
' The circuit court interpreted Sanders as resolving two inconsistent post-
Chadwick cases: United States v. Finnegan, 568 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1977) (Chad-
wick was distinguished because the vehicle attracted police attention not a specific
container, and the warrantless search of a suitcase was thereby held valid under
Chambers); and United States v. Stevie, 582 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc),
cert. denied, 443 U.S. 911 (1979) (held Chadwick controlled regardless of the focus
of suspicion). 665 F.2d at 1166-67. Moreover, the circuit court in Ross believed
that Sanders implicitly rejected the Finnegan approach and accepted the Stevie
approach. Id. at 1167.
655 F.2d at 1167.
' Id. Furthermore, the circuit court stated that "the administrative feasibility
of a distinction based on whether the object of suspicion is the car or the con-
tainer" demands too much of police. Id. at 1168 n.21.
[Vol. 31:529
36https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol31/iss3/9
WARRANTLESS CONTAINER SEARCHES
circuit court in Ross interpreted Sanders as eliminating the specific versus
the general information distinction left open in United States v. Chadwick.m
The circuit court also refused to adopt an "unworthy container" rule
in Ross to authorize warrantless searches of certain containers "less stable"
than the luggage in Chadwick and Sanders."' The majority reasoned that
such a rule would require police to make fine distinctions regarding the
size and quality of material of countless varieties of containers.268 The
rule would also "snare those without the means or sophistication to use
worthy containers." '269 Thus, the circuit court only needed to determine
Ross' privacy interest in each container. After analyzing the facts, the
circuit court concluded that the means of storage and the placement of
the containers in a locked car trunk were actions "calculated to secure
the privacy of his possessions against intrusions by members of the public";
therefore, the warrantless search was invalid. °
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Ross,21' reversed the cir-
cuit court and drastically expanded the automobile search exception to
validate the warrantless search, if based on probable cause of a general
nature, of any container seized from an automobile. 2 The Court specifically
held
that the scope of the warrantless search authorized by [Carroll
v. United States] is no broader and no narrower than a magistrate
could legitimately authorize by warrant. If probable cause justifies
the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search
266 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
267 655 F.2d at 1169. Accord United States v. Hodge, 519 F. Supp. 654 (E.D.
Tenn. 1981) (search of blanket wrapped around rifles held valid as not a container
within purview of Robbins rule); United States v. Pillo, 522 F. Supp. 855 (M.D.
Pa. 1981) (search of tupperware-type container invalid under Justice Stewart's
analysis in Robbins).
' 655 F.2d at 1170.
269 Id. (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court summarily dismissed the "un-
worthy container" argument as an improper constitutional distinction. Ross, 456
U.S. at __, 102 S. Ct. at 2171.
'0 655 F.2d at 1171 (footnote omitted). Notably, Judge Tamm argued in dis-
sent that the automobile exception authorized the warrantless seizure of the con-
tainers, but the Katz test must be applied to justify the warrantless search. Id.
at 1172-73 (dissenting opinion). As to the paper bag, Judge Tamm contended that
the only privacy interest is possession and control, and that once the bag was
lawfully seized under the automobile exception, there was no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy. Id. at 1174. Moreover, paper bags only offer "minimal protection
against accidental and deliberate intrusions" and are not as secure or permanent
as luggage and therefore are "not inevitably associated with the expectation of
privacy." Id. at 1177-78. Accordingly, Judge Tamm would invalidate the search
of the pouch because of its similarity to luggage. Id. at 1179.
" In a solid 6-3 majority opinion, Justice Stevens was joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor. Justices Bren-
nan, White and Marshall dissented. 456 U.S. 798, _ 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2157 (1982).
2 Id. at __, 102 S. Ct. at 2159.
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of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal
the object of the search."'
Therefore, "[o]nly the prior approval of the magistrate is waived. 274
The Court reaffirmed the basic rule that " 'searches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment .... .. 275 The
automobile exception, according to the Ross Court, is unquestionably a
"'specifically established and well-delineated'" exception to that rule.27 6
Justice Stevens pointed out that, prior to Chadwick and Sanders, it was
widely understood that the permissible scope of the automobile excep-
tion under Carroll extended to searches of containers found during a lawful
search of an automobile. 7 Justice Stevens asserted further that the Court
had implicitly sustained such warrantless container searches in prior
cases." The Court distinguished Chadwick and Sanders as container search
cases in which suspicion was confined to a particular container rather
than the entire vehicle as in Ross.279 Thus, the Ross Court believed that
warrantless searches of containers located during a lawful automobile ex-
ception search have always been valid, and that Chadwick and Sanders
merely "qualified" this rule by requiring a search warrant only when police
know the specific container in which contraband may be concealed. '
The Ross majority reasoned that the "practical consequences of the
[automobile exception] would be largely nullified if the permissible scope
of a warrantless search of an automobile did not include containers and
packages found inside the vehicle."28 ' For the Court, the major practical
consequence of its decision is "the prompt and efficient completion of the
task at hand": the warrantless search for contraband.282 The Ross Court
maintained that the extent of a warrantless search under the automobile
" Id. at __, 102 S. Ct. at 2172. Offering consolation, Justice Stevens warned
that police officers "lose the protection that a warrant would provide to them
in an action for damages brought by an individual claiming that the search was
unconstitutional." Id. at - n.32, 102 S. Ct. at 2172 n.32.
" Id. at __, 102 S. Ct. at 2172 (footnote omitted).
" Id., quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
276 Id.
" Id. at __, 102 S. Ct. at 2169. But see id. at __, 102 S. Ct. at 2178-79
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
278 Id. at , 102 S. Ct. at 2169, citing Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694
(1931) (approving the warrantless search of whiskey bags seized during an
automobile exception search); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) (war-
rantless search of packages of unstamped liquor). However, the contents of these
packages may have been inferred from the nature of the container. If so, foot-
note 13 in Sanders would allow the warrantless search under the plain view doc-
trine and the automobile exception would simply not be applicable. See supra
text accompanying notes 188-90.
278 456 U.S. at __, 102 S. Ct. at 2168.
2 Id. at n.25, 102 S. Ct. at 2170 n.25.
281 Id. at , 102 S. Ct. at 2170.
262 Id. at , 102 S. Ct. at 2170-71 (footnote omitted).
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exception should be the same as a search conducted pursuant to a valid
search warrant. This result was supported by the Court's contention that
[t]he practical considerations that justify a warrantless search
of an automobile continue to apply until the entire search of the
automobile and its contents has been completed. Arguably, the
entire vehicle itself (including its upholstery) could be searched
without a warrant, with all wrapped articles and containers found
during that search then taken to a magistrate. But prohibiting
police from opening immediately a container in which the object
of the search is most likely to be found and instead forcing them
first to comb the entire vehicle would actually exacerbate the in-
trusion on privacy interests. Moreover, until the container itself
was opened the police could never be certain that the contraband
was not secreted in a yet undiscovered portion of the vehicle; thus
in every case in which a container was found, the vehicle would
need to be secured while a warrant was obtained."'3
The Court's rationale has several shortcomings. First, the practical con-
siderations underlying the automobile exception only justify the warrant-
less seizure of containers. As the Court acknowledged in Sanders, the
location of a container in a vehicle does not lessen the legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in its contents and the exigency of the container's mobility,
by virtue of its location in a vehicle, disappears once securely within police
control." The Ross Court circumvented this rationale in the automobile
exception context by distinguishing Sanders as a non-automobile search
case." 5 However, that does not overcome the fact that exclusive police
control of a container eliminates the threat of its removal. Indeed, the
Court engages in legal fiction when it holds in container search cases such
as Sanders that the exigencies dissipate once the container is seized; but
that in automobile search cases like Ross, the exigencies remain even after
a container is in exclusive police control. The Ross Court rationalized this
difference on the focus of the search: the entire vehicle versus a particular
container. Yet, the more plausible explanation is the Court's explicit un-
willingness to preclude anyone's use of a vehicle, and now its containers,
for a brief period of time while a warrant is obtained pursuant to the
fourth amendment. 296
In addition, the specific/general information distinction creates an
anomalous situation which thwarts the precise goal Ross was intended
2 Id. at - n.28, 102 S. Ct. at 2171 n.28.
28 442 U.S. 753, 763 (1979). See supra text accompanying notes 178-80.
285 456 U.S. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2168.
288 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970); see supra text accompanying
notes 118-19. Yet, the Chambers-Court authorized police to conduct a warrantless
search of an automobile either in the field or later at the police station. Therefore,
the Court implicitly authorized the temporary warrantless seizure of the vehicle.
See generally supra notes 117, 120.
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to promote: effective and efficient crime prevention and detection. Police
are expected to conduct thorough investigations and gather all pertinent
facts to prevent spurious and precipitous arrests, searches and accusa-
tions. The specific/general information distinction, however, discourages
police from gathering and verifying detailed information. Instead, under
Ross, police are rewarded by not having to obtain a warrant when they
only have general information that contraband may be located somewhere
in a vehicle. 8 ' Even more startling, police will also decide when they have
enough general information to constitute probable cause. The only check
on this unbridled discretion is post hoc review by a court presented with
the fruits of the warrantless search. In addition, the details of the search
will now be colored by hindsight.
Furthermore, the bright line rule established in Ross rests on the
unrealistic assumption that police will discontinue an automobile search
as soon as contraband is found in a container. This assumption presup-
poses that police, with only general information that contraband is
somewhere in a vehicle, will suddenly know that a particular container
was the object of their search all along and that no other contraband is
in the vehicle. 88 Arguably, the discovery of contraband in a single con-
tainer, depending on the item(s) sought, may lead police to believe that
more contraband is concealed elsewhere and that the initial discovery
may not establish, as asserted in Ross, that without the immediate search
of a container "police could never be certain that the contraband was not
secreted in a yet undiscovered portion of the vehicle." '89 Thus, broad
vehicular searches may not be prevented by the warrantless search of
its containers.
Indeed, the facts in Ross even negate the Court's rationale. The police
in Ross opened a paper bag found in the trunk of a car and discovered
glassine bags containing a white powder." ° The bag was returned to the
287 In fact, the Ross Court indicated that in automobile search cases it would
be too burdensome to require police to obtain a warrant. 456 U.S. at __ n.21,
102 S. Ct. at 2168 n.21 (quoting Robbins, 453 U.S. at 433-34 (Powell, J., concurring)).
Furthermore, the Ross majority claimed that the aggregate burden of obtaining
a warrant to search a container, would unnecessarily remove " 'the officer from
his normal police duties.' " Id. This suggests that applying for warrants is not
a "normal police duty." If this is true, then perhaps there are too many warrant
exceptions in that warrantless searches have become the rule and warrant ap-
plications have become the exception. See supra note 29.
288 "This rule plainly has peculiar and unworkable consequences: the Govern-
ment 'must show that the investigating officer knew enough but not too much,
that he had sufficient knowledge to establish probable cause but insufficient
knowledge to know exactly where the contraband was located.'" 456 U.S. at __,
102 S. Ct. at 2180 (dissenting opinion) (citation omitted).
289 Id. at __ n.28, 102 S. Ct. at 2171 n.28 (emphasis added); id. at -, 102
S. Ct. at 2179 (dissenting opinion). Indeed, police should conduct thorough searches
where appropriate. The holding in Ross, however, does not necessarily encourage
thorough police work.
' Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2160.
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trunk and the car was driven to the police station and searched thor-
oughly."' This is a result the Ross Court assumed would not occur. Since
the temporary seizure of the vehicle and its delayed search at police head-
quarters are implicitly valid under Chambers, only spurious reasoning can
justify the additional intrusion of a warrantless container search on prac-
ticability grounds. 9 ' The rule in Ross is thus reduced to nothing more
than a rule of convenience for law enforcement in contravention of tradi-
tional fourth amendment safeguards.
The most valuable fourth amendment safeguard compromised by Ross
is the elimination of prior approval by a disinterested magistrate. As
Justice Marshall cogently stated in dissent,
[tihe warrant requirement is crucial to protecting Fourth Amend-
ment rights because of the importance of having the probable
cause determination made in the first instance by a neutral and
detached magistrate. Time and again, we have emphasized that
the warrant requirement provides a number of protections that
a post-hoc judicial evaluation of a policeman's probable cause does
not. 3
Thus, the shift of the initial probable cause determination to law enforce-
ment agents, who by the very nature of their jobs are not neutral and
detached, effectively removes any public reassurance that privacy inter-
ests will be protected judicially.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Ross brought the
automobile search exception, established in Carroll v. United States, full
circle. Police now may conduct warrantless searches of containers
discovered in a vehicle pursuant to a lawful automobile exception search
in addition to the warrantless search of the vehicle itself. The only re-
quirement under Ross is that police have probable cause to believe that
contraband is located somewhere in the vehicle. The automobile exception
is qualified, however, by the distinction created in United States v. Chad-
wick and Arkansas v. Sanders. This qualification is that the automobile
exception is inapplicable, and a warrant is therefore required, to a search
of containers located in a vehicle when police have specific information
that a particular container, rather than the vehicle in general, contains
contraband. As previously noted, this anamolous distinction discourages
thorough police work by permitting the warrantless search of a vehicle
and its containers, when based on general information, that is broader
291 Id.
2 "[Tjhe traditional rationales for the automobile exception plainly do not sup-
port extending it to the search of a container found inside a vehicle." Id. at __,
102 S. Ct. at 2176 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
293 Id. at , 102 S. Ct. at 2174.
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than a search authorized by a magistrate for the search of containers
when police know which container to search.
Post Ross litigation will undoubtedly focus on this general/specific in-
formation distinction as well as whether police had search probable cause
at all. Arguably, the application of the distinction will depend upon the
nexus between the vehicle and the container because the degree of infor-
mation standard is unworkable. Thus, where the nexus is substantial, as
in Ross, courts will uphold the warrantless container search under the
automobile exception despite specific information regarding a particular
container. However, where the container is fortuitously located in a
vehicle, as in Sanders, the nexus will be deemed insubstantial and a search
warrant will therefore be required. The results are distinguishable as
automobile searches and container searches, respectively, and the disparity
only makes sense in light of the Court's apparent belief that there is a
lesser expectation of privacy in one's vehicle.
Future litigation will also challenge container searches on grounds that
police did not have sufficient information to constitute probable cause.
However, post-hoe judicial review of probable cause will rarely be worth-
while since most courts, when presented with the fruits of the search,
will be reluctant to suppress the evidence. As a consequence, Ross effec-
tuated an unchecked, wholesale shift of the initial probable cause deter-
mination from magistrates to police. State courts must remedy this
situation by interpreting their state constitutions as authorizing only the
warrantless seizure of containers pursuant to the automobile exception
to prevent the needless erosion of privacy interests.
In New York v. Belton, the Supreme Court has similarly used the
diminished expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle and its contents as
a springboard to expand unnecessarily the government's search and seizure
powers. The Belton Court created a "bright line" rule by holding that
a vehicle's passenger compartment and its containers are per se subject
to warrantless searches under the search incident to a lawful arrest ex-
ception. The minimum requirement in Belton is that police have probable
cause to arrest; search probable cause is not needed as in the automobile
exception context. Consequently, the Belton rule is more susceptible to
police abuse, than the rule in Ross, and poses a greater threat to the
fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Post Belton litigation will be focused primarily upon the spatial and con-
temporaneous limits of the rule. Once again, courts confronted with
evidence of a crime will be reluctant to grant a motion to suppress the
evidence.
The net effect of the far-reaching results in Belton and Ross is the
diminished role of the magistrate and the shift of the balance of power
under the fourth amendment to law enforcement agencies, at least in the
motor vehicle context. The Court has seemingly abandoned its longstand-
ing warrant preference policy in favor of alleged clearer rules to aid police
in ferreting out crime. Proper fourth amendment analysis should seek
[Vol. 31:529
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a balance between guarantees against needlessly broad search and seizure
powers, on the one hand, and effective law enforcement on the other.
Arguably, this balance was struck when the fourth amendment was
drafted and the concomitant cost of protecting privacy interests was that
some crimes would go undetected and some criminals would go unappre-
hended as a result of procedural safeguards. Meaningful checks and
balances of broad governmental search powers are effectively removed,
however, by the elimination of the initial probable cause determination
made by neutral and detached magistrates.
The most effective way to uphold sacred fourth amendment values is
to maintain the status quo by neutralizing each police-citizen confronta-
tion without denegrating fourth amendment liberties to secondary rights.
The least intrusive means should be sought at an intermediate level of
intrusion to achieve the most reasonable result. In retrospect, Belton and
Ross seem to represent more of an over-reaction to a steadily increasing
crime rate in the United States than a careful analysis of the exigencies
and circumstances of each confrontation. Indeed, the -Court could have
provided clear guidelines for the police in these cases by validating the
warrantless seizure of containers under each exception and by requiring
a search warrant once the container is reduced to exclusive police control.
Moreover, state courts shoud preserve judicial integrity by curtailing the
unnecessarily broad police powers established by Belton and Ross
respectively.
CHRISTOPHER J. ST. JOHN
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